Australia’s defence planners are currently contemplating the acquisition of new submarines to secure Australia’s defence capabilities into the second half of this century.
It is likely, however, that these submarines will be bought for the wrong reason; they will be the wrong type; and with the wrong design.
1. The Wrong Reason
Australia’s current submarines, the Collins class, are a disaster. Of six commissioned, only one is currently operational. They were chosen for the wrong reason. Australia chose a long-range and multi-tasked boat, capable of assisting the US Navy in its Pacific Ocean operations. But this choice begs the question: should Australian defence dollars be spent to further American, or Australian national interests? Since W.W.2, Australia’s obsequious support of US foreign policy has led to ignominious adventures in Vietnam, Iraq and Afganistan, and the deaths of hundreds of Australian servicemen. Australia owes it to herself to purchase submarines which support Australian, rather than American interests. Australia’s national interests are increasingly separating from those of America, and are being drawn towards China. China is Australia’s largest trading partner, and will soon be the world’s richest country. By the time the new submarines are fully operational (some time after 2030), China will rival the US as a military power, and will certainly exceed the US as a Pacific military power. It would be foolhardy for Australia to choose its next submarines based on a desire for an interoperability of the Australian and US navies.
2. The Wrong Type
The Australian Defence White Paper, released in May 2009, specifies the requirements for the new submarines. These include a long range (even longer than the Collins class) and a strategic strike (ie cruise missile) capability. Like with the Collins class, the specifications are drawn up to ensure that they can assist the US Navy. As a result, they will be inordinately expensive, estimated at over A$3 billion each. A$36 billion for 12 boats. Excessive range (so they can operate with US Naval Task Forces) and the ability to launch cruise missiles (a capability which will held by Australia’s new Joint Strike Fighters), results in a cost disproportionate to the benefits to Australia. Australia would be better served by procuring smaller and cheaper submarines, fitted out to defend Australia’s interests, not America’s.
3. The Wrong Design
The Defence White Paper sets out a long list of high-level specifications for the new submarines. Tailor-made to these Australian requirements, there will be no sales to other navies. Familiar ring? Yes- the Collins class submarines have the same provenance. And because the Collins class submarines were uniquely Australian, they were untried – and failed. They failed technically, and had major cost and delivery over-runs. Low mechanical readiness has exacerbated crew retention issues.
Instead of designing submarines from scratch, Australia should purchase proven submarines. They could still be built in Australia. Buying submarines which are already operating with other navies reduces the risk of failure. And it means the purchase decision can be made considerably later, and take advantage of new technology and with a clearer picture of Australia’s security imperatives. Australia should buy proven submarines. To do otherwise puts Australia’s security at risk.
Michael Melville Kirwan 11 February 2010 Biographical note: Michael Kirwan was previously an active officer with the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, in the Naval Intelligence Division.
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